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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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coming into Russia, supplies which to such a great extent had helped
the Soviets to exist and turn the tide of war on their territory.
There was yet one other factor which the Russian dictator had to
consider and a most important point to the ruling circle of the Kremlin.
Twenty-five years before, the Englishman who now sat with Stalin at the
conference table at Yalta, had organised and planned a crusade against the
Soviets. He had rallied the peoples of Europe to fight the Bolshevik
menace and had the Prussian junkers in those days been given the oppor-
tunity they would, undoubtedly have marched with Lloyd George and
Churchill. Twenty years afterwards these Junkers were to begin their march
against Russia—under Hitler. Stalin did not discriminate between the two
invasions by the warriors of the Capitalist world. These two waves of the
Capitalist sea., about which he had instructed Comrade Ivanov just before
the Second Great War, were the one and same flood as far as he was
concerned. Stalin, the man who left his religion behind when he ran away
from the Orthodox seminary,—this unfinished clergyman adopted a new
religion in the Socialist underground, its creed,—that only facts mattered,
that feelings and sentiments were a testimony of weakness and as such,
should be extirpated ! Under the influence of this materialistic conception,
Stalin was bound to possess the conviction that if he were now to betray
the Allies by commencing peace negotiations with Hitler, it would be a
signal for them, in order to avoid a new Brest Litovsk, to make an immed-
iate peace with Germany. The Soviets had indeed suspected London of
such an attempt to arrive at an understanding with the Fuehrer a year ago,
and the official Soviet Press agency openly accused Downing Street.
The British Press in answer commented mildly that the Russians were
over-sensitive and suspicious. . . . Nevertheless, the possibility cannot
be excluded at this stage that Hitler had already made peace proposals
to the Atlantic Democracies and perhaps to the Russians as well.
There was one factor which influenced the possibility of negotiating
with Hitler, which as Stalin knew was of the greatest importance, namely,
if Hitler found himself obliged to choose between Russia's offer to e cease
fire ' or the Allies, he would without hesitation have chosen the latter5 s.
Although he had deserted and betrayed the Western World of which he
had proved such an erring son, nevertheless there was no getting away
from the fact that Germany formed part of this World,
The Fuehrer's intention to fight to the last square yard of German
soil was based on the conviction that sooner or later he would be able to
arrive at an understanding, either with the West or the East through the
betrayal of one by the other. ... He did not believe that England
would tolerate the enormity of the Kremlin's demands and consequent
stabilisation of the Soviets in Central Europe, or that Russia would not
repeat the story of Brest Litovsk.
On September 6, 1943, Churchill elaborating upon his proposed basis
for a world organisation, declared in his speech at Harvard University